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FISCAI, E'EIIERALISAI: P R O G R M I BUDGETING

AN11 TIIE \ll~LTILE:VEL GOVERNMENTAL SETTING
F'. Gregory [layden
lssoczate Professor of Economics, lJnzverstty o f Nebraska-Lincoln

'The purpose of this artic:Ie is to determine what theoretical and policy
conclusions are consistent with the orthodox theory of social arid merit
wants,' the treatment of distribution as a component of efficiency,2 and
a Planning-Progarnming-Rudgeti~igSystem when they are placed in a
federalist setting with states' rights a n d local autonomy. The conclusion
is that neitller matching nor equalizatio~igrarits should be used in intergoverntnr:ntal fiscal relations and that use of traditiorlal intergovernmental
fiscal devices will not assure success of a programmed budget.
THE ECONOMIC EFFECT ON THE ALLOCATION BUDGET
CAUSED BY HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL SPLITTING
IN POLITICAL FEDERALISM

In this section the effect of political federalism on fiscal matters will be
;~pproachedin two ways. The first model will have n o spatial spill-outs or
spill-ins of cost or benefits and will have a d1:sirable distribution of income.
'I'he other rnodel will relax t h e stringerit assumptions of t h e first and
analyze spill-outs through ir~tlifferericeanalysis.
lllodel without Benefit Spills

The first rnodel is of country A with initial assumptions as follows:
1. T l ~ e r care two levels of government--the: cetrtral authority A and
subsidiary (sub) uriits W, X, 17, and Z.

2. There arc! two types of social goods-i/l, which benefits everyone in
./I equally, artd !V, which benefits everyone equally in the sub in which it is
provided (uniform benefits). 'Thus there arc r ~ obenefit spills.
3. Social goods are tax-financed with

110 debt

creation.

4. Full employrrlent prevails.

5 . There arc n o cost spills from sub t o sub. Thus there is no tax shifting to citizens of other subs.

' ~ i c h a r d A. blusgrave, The lllteory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1 959).
2 ~ u r t o nA. Weisbrod, "Income Redistribution Effects and Benefit-Cost Analysis,"
in Samuel B. Chase, ed., Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1968).
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6. A1 irlcomea arcLequal, and tire tastes regarding i n c o n ~ rdistributior~
are such that the citizens of il wish t o leavc. it equal.
7. 211 benefits and costs call be rneasurc,d.
The central govt:rnment A will providt, 121 and the subs will providi: $'Vto
suit the tastes of their ow11 c i t i z e ~ ~ s'T.o satisfy the benefit principle, all
citizens of ..I
will pay equal taxes to .1 1)t:cause they sharc: ,l.lequally (not
because their incornes are equal). All citizens within each sub will pa?
equal taxes to that sub, although thc arnou~llmay be different from suh
to sub due to differences in tastt:. Of course, .4 will provide ,I! up to thtl
point that the marginal social cost of ,Wis equal t o t h e marginal social
benefits of 121, and IT), X, Y , and Z will determine their level of N i n a
similar rnanner.
In deciding upon an .V,central goverr~mer~t
4 will need to define what
kind of M is desired (for c*xample,riot all tducation is alike) and what level
of servicr is t o be provided, and will design a plan to take account of the
technical difficulties involved. That is. a well-defined programmatic approach to achieve a well-defined goal is appropriate. Programmatic funds
may or ]nay not pass through sub offices. That will be determined b j
administrative ease, but adrnirlistrativc, ease is not our interest here. h o w if'
all arc, t o benefit equally, there rnust l)c no discrimination among areas by
providing differant service levels.

Having equal service levtrls dotrs not rrlearl equal expenditures in all sub
units nor docs it mean that c.xpenditures will vary in any given manner
with income. Exper~ditures rrrust IJV varied t o allow for technical variations. Such variations include everythirrg from soil chemistry t o ethnic:
groups and the vestiges of history-t.vt:rything that will affect cost in providing the desired level of perfornlancc.. s s u m e ,A is to provide an integrated transportation system and a vcnt:real disease prt:vt:ntion program.
Ur~lessthere is a definite correlatiort betwi.cn ~ h hardness
r
of rock for road
beds and income or between vc:nerral disc:asc: susceptibility and incon~c.
expenditures should not be tied to incon~t.lt~vels.
If ?W is provided t o the point that social costs equal social benefits, therct
is n o reason for voluntary matching grants and/or unconditio~talgrants to
provide a programmatic service. 111 thv first place, the government of
wants a certain level of social good ,W provided, hut unless the citizens'
wants of A are not to be frustrated by 2, then the power structure of Z
should not be allowed voluntarily t o rcject t h e program by rejecting thc
funds or b y accepting t h e funds but using them for other than t h e intended
program. Second, the citizens of A should not be forced to share the costs
beyond program needs that a sub area decides t o add for local enjoyment,
such as a lavish gymnasium, simply because Z will get matching funds for
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all "educational" expenditures. Third, matching funds may induce a misallocation of local resources by bribing local governments t o withdraw
funds from local wants.
Now let us change the second assumption arid assume that a social good
is such that part of the benefits will acc,rue t o the people of A and part of
the benefits t o those of the sub only (uniform benefits in each). Now if
only A provides the social good to the point that the marginal social cost
is equal to the marginal social benefit, there will be an underallocation of
resources unless the local government also provides the same social good t o
the point that its marginal social cost equals its marginal social benefit.
That is, the citizens of the sub may discover that they want a level of the
social good beyond that provided by central A.
iln example is education. The central government may provide a given
level to all subs, and some subs may want additional education t o capture
additional local benefits. Now, once A's lecel of education has been established, there is no reason that the sub carinot have its own program t o
provide still more. From the standpoint of efficiency, there is no reason t o
reward or punish those who provide more education than the central level.
Uor should financial punishment and reward be meted out by A according
ito the tax effort of the sub unit's program. It is not the place of the higher
level t o make judgments abctut purely local wants. 'The higher level has its
responsibility to provide a gven level of service. If A wants a higher level
of service, then its program should provid~:that higher level. If A's program is intended to yrovid~:four years of a specific type of education t o
each child, then Z carinot use A's funds to give twelve years of education
to a ~ C Wand nonta t o others. Therefore the total educational program may
he difl'erc>rrtin each sub, but in all subs A's program is guaranteed.
Let us assume that sub % decides not t o cooperate with central A in
administering A's program of insuring a given level of services in all cities.
There is no reason from the standpoint of efficiency that A cannot go
directly to city P to administer the program if P is wiHing t o cooperate.
11' is an administrative question, not a question of who should provide how
ruurh of the service. The latter question hab already been answered. The
decision has been made by the higher level A t o provide the service. Since
Z will not cooperate, the question is whether A should set up its own
ntllninistrative facilitic~sor share P's.

,Il'odel with Benefit Spills
Thus far it is cviderit that there is no reason for matching and equalization grants fro111 one level ot' government to another. We have not thus
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Car considered, however, t h e most important aspect of intergovernmental
fiscal relations, the aspect usually used t o rationalize rnatchirlg grants~iarrlelybenefit arid cost spill-outs and spill-ins. 4 case of a benefit spill-out:
for instance, is one in which part of the benefits that are provided by one.
sub unit accrue t o individuals across a political boundary in allother sub
unit. In a system where vertical and horizontal splitting of authority exists.
spills occur across political boundaries into areas over which the providir~g
government has no jurisdictior~. I r i order lo show the effec.~of' benefit
spill-outs o n resource allocatiorr. let us assume that each sub decides how
much education it will provide and that part of the benefits of that education will become spill-outs to another sub: and, in a similar manncr, the
other sub will contribute spill-ins to thc. forn~c:rsub.
Let us assume that without t h e phenomena of spill-outs or spill-ins.
school district X would be faced with a tra~~sformation
curve .SIB(Figure I )
between education o n the vertical axis and a composite of all other goods
o n the horizontal axis. Likewise Y is faced with transformation curve ,4'R1
(Figure 2). Figures 1 and 2 indicate that Y is a less wealthy district than
X but that they both have the same technical possibilities. Equilibrium for
X is at (1 and for Y it is at a'. The optimum allocation of resources to
education, if the distribution is assumed desirable, is the provision of' oh
educatior~in X and ob' in k:
Vow let us consider the fact that b m ~ f i t sfro111 education spill out t o
other areas for the following reasons.

1. RIigratiori of students t o other areas transports the productioricreating capacity, the taxation capacity. the lower unemployment ratrs,
and the lower social welfare costs.
2. Advances in technology and improvements in skills from education
increase productivity arid decrease costs. The decreawd cbostienhanct. tht.
income of people in other areas through the national market.
3. The option value of education provides the o p p o r t u n ~ t ?to o b t a i ~ i
still further education, the opportunity lo have broader employment
choices, and the o p p o r t u n ~ t yto hc,dge against the vicissitudes of technological change. The whole society benefits from this inventory of options.

4. Education helps t o provide an ~niorrned,literate electorate i r ~national, state, and local elections.
111 introducing external benefit spill-outs into our school districts, X anci
Y, we will assume that t h e benefit spill-outs are the same proportion of the

total benefits a t all levels of educational output. We will also assurne tht:
blyrdal "backwash" effect in that the poor school district will lose a
greater percentage of its total educational benefits. Thest: two assumptions
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Figure 1
Education

Education

District X

Figure 2
District Y
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will shift the two transtormation curkc.5 to 4C anti 1 '( '
the equilibrium t o oc and oc' of' cducatlor~.

11)

\

'111(1

1 . .111(1

make

E d u c a t i o ~has
~ become* nlorc. c.xpc.nsivc. rt,lativc. to tilt, c.o~r~pobitt.
I)(.causc a proportion of each dollar spent 0 1 1 cthlcation u-ill l~:ro111(.
;I s1)ilIout t o other districts. It is this technical naturt. of the be11t:Cit that c,lrangc,s
thtk relativt, cost ol' the two goods. Due. t o this (.hang(. it1 the c ~ ~ofs tc*tlucntion, Weisbrod says that in rrraking its d r c i s i o ~c:ach
~ (1istric:t \\ill e1isrc.gartl
both spill-ins t o itself ant1 the‘ valuta of' the 1)c~nefitsgoing to ottl(.rs:
W'hile spill-outs of benefits tend to ditrlirlish c~xprrlditrlrc.~
from their optimal level, spill-iris rna! not bring opposite.
rcsults. . . . To t h r cxtertt that they arc, the spill-ill>
c,onstitute fixed benefits; as such they will llave rlo ini.111cmcc o n decisions a t the margirt. . . . 3 .
Therefore thert* will be a total underallocat~orlof resourc r . to t*(lrlcat~o~l
The composite good will be iubstitutcd f o r r.ducatlo~~
N a n U'illian~s4objects to thr fact that only tht* substitution c.l'f't:ct ih
considert:d i r i b'eisbrod's analysis artd insists that thf, additional ir1c:onlr
created by benefit spill-ins rrlust also 1 ) c~orrsidt~rt.d.
~
.-\c.c.ordirlg to his lir~t.
of reasoning, 111 our n ~ o d r lthe bc'nc't~t -pill-ln would c.,~usc. tl~c.budget
restralnta. 1C and A'(". to makc. a parallel s h ~ l t o E l ) and E'l)' The yh~ft
t o ED for X will be equal to spill-out 'L Irorr~Y antJ thv s h ~ f t o b"nrfor Z
w11l be equal t o thv -pill-out ~Vlfrorn1. 'Cott. though, that a t tI1(. rtvw 1 ~ 1 t u librlurn. the total of od and od' t.ducdt~art15 grtSattbrth'rn the or~girtaltotal
ot o b and ob'
After benefit spill-outs and spill-ins have been corlsidered therc: is a total
overallocation of resources t o edrlcatiori iC tht. origir~aldistributior~of
resourccs is considered t h e correct distribution. There is less tduc:atio~~
(underallocation) irk the poor district but rnorr educatior~(ovt:rallocatior~)
in the rich district because of the resources it has rrccivetl frorn th(: poor
district and because of its tastes. This is si~riilarto thc shil't o f c.ducatvc1
people from the central city (Xj to tht, suburbs ( Y ) \vht:rc~thc: s u b ~ ~ ri. h
given a greater tax base and thert:f;)re. 1)ettt:r scl~ools.I+:vc.r~il' tht, two
Cistricts had equal spill-outs. t:qual spill-ills. and tht. 3anlc tastrh. ~ h c .
original eqdlibrinrn woultl not br rc:achc.d because 01' the diff'rrrrlt (.l'i'c(.t
caused by spill-outs and spill-iris, t h spill-out
~
being a suhstitutiorl ef'l't:ct
and the spill-in being an incorllr rf'fvct.
3 ~ u r t o nA. Weisbrod, External Benefits of Public Education: .An Econon~ic
Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Industrial Relations Center, 1964).
p. 6.

' ~ l a n Williams, "The Optimal Provision o f Public Goods in a System of 1,ocal
Government." Journal o f Political Econonxy l>XXIV(February. 1966).
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Because of thc rc:distribution of iricomc., Williams termed this situation
an ovt:rallocatiori oi resources t o education. Braitlard and Dolbear, howtAvrr.say that ". . . one should not stipulate a distribution of income, derive
o p t i m l ~ matnounts for thti various conirnotlities, arid then compare these
aniounts with thr: aniounts that would prvvail under a different distribution o l incotne."' IJuless the origirtal distrilmtion is considered more
tl(:sirable, the distribution after spills cannot be considered a misallocation.
'The gt:r~cralproposition that Saniuelson and blusgrave have stressed rlumerous times is that tht: o p t i n ~ u mallocation ran be determined only after
decidir~gupon an optimuln distribution. ltegrdless of what distribution
t)c,nc:hrnark is used :is thr. corrtbct clistril~~tion,
however, two conclusions
I-VIII~I~II.
First, the substitution efft:ct will causc fewer resources t o be
11t:vc)trd to c,d~icationthan if b e n d i t spills did riot exist. Second, unequal
spills arnong districts trc:at some. districts morr favorably than other
clistrictj.
Evidently Hreak think> that thc original (before spills are introduced)
tlistribution and equilibriurri is always the c.orrect lbenrhrnark because he
justifi(~srnatching grants o n the basi.; of rccdpturing the escaped benefits.
IIc says:
Iritergoverr~mcr~tal
p a n t s dt:signt:tl t o minirriize the distorting effect of benefit spillouts o n the level of state
and local spr:nding should . . . bc rllatchirig grarits with
both the grantor arid the grantee sharing in the cost of
the supported programs . . . . Such a situation calls for
variable rnatchirlg grants . . . .6
'1hert:fore each lower level uf government will be givc:n a matching subsidy
c:ciual t o its spill-outs, and sirlce subsidies must be acquired from some
source. they will all be taxed equal t o their spill-ins. This means that
pa)vt:rty-stricken districts, which are distorting optimality by having more
spill-ins than spill-outs, will be taxt:d more heavily and receive less subsidy
than rich districts. Of course, this analysis is only a n excuse used by
aclvocates of matching grants. I t is iricorrect in principle, impractical for
policj, arld unacctsptable in terms of equity.
'Ue can set, from 1:igurr 3 that t h e analysis is incorrect in principle.
E'igurt, 3 is the barne as Figure 2 after accounting for benefit spills and
arriving a t thts c,quilibrium allocation of resources t o education of E'D'.

S ~ i l l i a mC. Brainard and F. Trenery L)olbear, "The Possibility of Oversupply of
Local 'Public' Goods: A Critical Note," Journal of Political Economy LXXV (Februa r y , 19hi'), p. 87.

' ~ e o r ~F.e Break, lntergouernnaental Fiscal Relations in the United States (Washington, I).(:.: The Rrookings Institution, 1967), p. 77.
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Figure :-I
Education

District Y

Composite
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Now if we give a subsidy to district Y equal t o spill-outs n and tax equal
to spill-ins rn, we see that the new equilibrium is not the original benchmark 06' but a different amount, oe'. So district Y will end up, after
subsidies and taxes, producing oe' of education and using part of the subsidy for increased production of the conlposite good.
Proposing the use of matching grants in order t o minimize the distorting
effect is also inlpractical for numerous reasons. These reasons will be
discussed in the following section.
THE PROGRAMM.4TIC APPROACH AND SPECIFIC ISSUES

An approach more consisterrt with current thought than the use of
traditional grant devices in providing a desired areawide goal is for the
morr central government to provide the service that is wanted. The significant benefit spills created by some government endeavors make it imperative that a higher level of government assume responsibilities for that
endeavor. Therefore the policy which stresses "local responsibility" in the
financing- of education is an irrational one if ecorlomic efficiency is considered important. This does not mean, Iiowever, that the local district
should riot be allowed t o finance the level it wishes t o finance, given the
local district's assessment of costs and benefits. The level of government
that should provide a function depends on how wide an area is encompassed by the benefits frorn the function. At all three levels of government
education provides direct benefits that do not spill over t o other governmental units.

The programmatic approach, as its nanle implies. is an approach in
which a specific program or plan is formulated and priced t o obtain a
governmental good or service. The progranl is formulated in order to take
account of peculiarities that arise in different areas. The programmatic
approach requires that the governmental unit responsible for a social or
merit good be responsible for designing a budgetary plan for mobilizing
the necessary resources t o provide that social or merit good.
The traditional approach has been more concerned with matters such as
i.otal expenditures, financial matching devices, equilization grants, fiscal
rapacity, and fiscal effort than with formulating and pricing programs. The
argument here is that these matters are not important t o providing a given
level of a given kind of ProLTam; therefore they art: not legitimate deter~rlinaritsof t,xpenditures. Elaich level of government has its own responsit~ilityand therefore should not allow its program to frustrate the fulfillment of that responsibility through fiscal dthvices such as those listed. The
most nonprogrammatic expenditure is thv unconditional grant which
requires no hpecific action on the part of the recipient. There is a wide
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varlet) of approaches tallirig betwrrri tht, purely programmatic dnd t h t ~
unconditior~al.
'The object ln a d o p t ~ n gthe programrnat~capproacli a.
destgn tor
r-xpenditurt. po11c.y IS neither that of measuring present or future denidr~d
nor the ~rriposs~ble
task of rnaking ~ I I' I prlori deter~rut~atlon
of H tidt tht,
demand "ought" t o be. ;Vunierous correlations and regrcasitoni havv brc.11
completed to discover he dcterrninarits of demand Such r~ltlcxc.s ,irt
hclpful 111 making expc.nd~turrpred~ctionb,but thty artLriot dn lndt>\ c)I
how nluch ought to bt, 5peiit because dtt~trldei.lnd prefert.n(t*.Irirorlg
polltical un1t5 111 spite of sirnilar "dt~terminants." The purpoqt. Ilert. ri to
adopt a11 ~rist~tutional
arrdngerncnt whtch will allow for the full t.xprc3*
sort of dernand, whatever the demand rrray br, and to allow for cl-iaiigt~s
in dernarid
What Level for What Program?
In the approach suggested here tbach 1rvt.l of goverrinlent would bc
allowed t o decide what programrnat~cgoals tt wishes t o pursue. \ o program would be excluded from any Ievr~l.The Idea has only partla1 acceptance III the literature. For ~ristancc~.
ltoger Frt.c~nansays
If the Eederal government f c d s it ought t o determine
what should be done in a particular public service, let it
take over t h e whole service rather than have the local or
state officials beco~riemert, agents o f the central government.7

Oh the one hand, Freeman is theoretically correct in hls perceptlor1 that
there arc. services the Federal government ought to provide. 111 addition.
he indicates that state and local goverrrments have prerogatives of their
own and should not just be agents o f tht. Federal government. Yt,t hr
denies t h e latter wheri he says, ". . . let it [Federal] takc over the wholr
service. . ." He is overlooking the possibility that t h e state or local artLa
may want t o capture additional local benefits by adding still more expenditures to the same service, and overlooking also the possibility of cooperation among Federal, state, and local levels in order for each t o carry out
its own program with the least admirtistrative cost.
Other authors also advocate that programs for distribution, growth, ant1
stabilization should be limited only to the central government. Brazer
expresses this idea when h e says:
. . . we recognize that government a t the city level cannot really hope t o operate effectively o r importantly in
7Koger A. Freeman, "Federal Grants and the Decline of the Federal System,"
Roceedings of the Fifty-eighth Annual Conference on Taxation of the National Tax
Association (November, 1965), p. 149.
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what I'rofcssor 'Ilusgravc~has ralletl tho "stabilization"
and "distributior~" bra~~c:hc:s
ol' thr public c.c.onolriy. . . .
I~Iirschsays, "Thc: F'cderal g o v e r r ~ n ~ e .r ~. t. by a Itroad consr:llsrls has 1)rc.n
assigned t h e income rcdistril~utingfunc.tic)~r. . . ."9 'I'wo pages later, however, hc cot~tradictshimsvlf by saying that public- wi:IEarcb services ran bc.
cffc:ctivc.ly- provided by tht. local urban govctrnniiXl~t,
and on his tablt. of
servicc. spillovers hr claims that n o bcncslit <pillavcrs car1 be expectchd frorn
public wellarc, scrvices. T11c:refort~ local govcbr~ltnc.~~ts
d o have an intcrest
in these rt:distril,utior~programs. IS the c.cbr~tralIcvc:l sets a tninirrrurn standard of ir~cornc. for csveryolrc, there is no rcason for preventing local areas
from raising that standard l o their own sati+l'ac:tion.

l~ldiuidualFreedom
There is also a rioneconomic a r g ~ ~ r r ~oefrt ~e t ~givt-11for lirniting the provisir)n of specified government p r o g r a t ~ ~IIIs a given Ir:vc:l of goverrrma~~t.
Some try t o c~xcludc:certain types of fiscal activity in a St:deralist systern
:;in~plyon the basis that local autonorny is cotern~inouswith individual
Freedoms. :in example is Freeman, who has said:

. . . the spertacular expansior~o f federal ?ants to state
and local units is leading t o a c'entralizat~onof goverri~nentalpower a t the expense of home rule, local-autorromy , and intlividual freedom."
itlother r:xample is Weisbrod, who says:
Individualism has long been a vital part of the American
culturc. Onc of its manifestations has been thc strong
tradition of local control over thc hystrnr of public educati0n.l
When o n r remembers that India, Pakistan, the Sovitxt (Jnion, t h e Congo,
Switzerland, Ethiopia, and Rrazil are all federalist states, it becomes somewhat cliificult to fit federal~sm into any rigid political, social, o r economic system. In some cases local autonomy rnay protect individual freedoms, yc:t wt. are aware that in other cases it protracts only local power
structures and institutions that are anathema to individual freedoms.

' ~ a r v e Brazer,
~
"The Role of Major Metropolitan Centers in State and Local
Finances," Papers and Proceedings of the Seventieth Annual Meeting, American Econo'mic Review XLVII (May, 1958). p. 312.
'werner Z. Hirsch, "Local Versus Areawide Urban Government Services," Nutic'nal Tux Journal XVIl (December, 1964), p. 336.
'O~reeman,op. cit., p. 135.
'~eisbrod,Public Education, op. cit., p. 10.
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With a pro~~arnrnatic.
approach thc:rtx is ;I ~iiuchbettcr charlet. o f rioticing obsolesccnct~sot' tt~cltl1ic1uc.b.ot' anal) zing c:ff'cctivcnc:ss. o i ' obtaining
I'r:edbacl\ information, and 01' triakitig I'utr~refiscal pr~,dictions.I'reseritly
ttidny programs are 1Irver J I I J ~ ) L ( ' ( ~10 d ~ t t ~ r r r i ~whetht'r
r i t ~ t h ~ dchteve
j
c'vc'~~
the ~ndefinitc. goal for wh~cli the,) &(.re. ir~tvnded.It~stcdd.only 'I Leu
guideposts arc, 111dicatc.d dt ~11thbeg~tlnlrtg-guidcpost~that ldtcr beco~nc.
vdguely defined rr.qutre~rieritswh1c.11 ~ n u i lb r Jtlrl b j the, gr~rdntresI r i order
to qualify for the grdtit. I )rcw ' ~ y5
l'hohc. who picture, \kashingtotr d b o r i t , rrlass ol t'ilcx\ and
computers coritairirng nlorc. itiforlnatiori tharl they woul(l
like. will bc c,ornfortc~d1)) ( t i c . c~wperit~ricc~~
of programplanners in attenlptlng to tbvaluatc. on-going progranis.
Whatever lhr files lid cornputctrs d o contain, thert, i~
precious little. in them about how rnariy arid whom tht.
programs arc reaching, and whet11c.r thry arc. doing what
thcy are supposed t o do. If thtb pnrpost. of' an adult hasic
cbtlucatior~ progranl IS to tract1 people how tc: r ~ u t ailti
i
write, the Offict. of Educatior~rnigh: reasonably I r c a 1.1pecttrd t o know how man, peoplt. theret)! actuall!
learned how to read and write, hut it does not . . .
The Public IIealth Srrvlce might bo expected to know
whcthrr its various health icrvictls are in fact riak king
people h e a l t h ~ t ~but
r , it docs nut . . Those working o n
the income niairilrnancc~stud\ found that thcb &'elfarc.
4dministrat1ori could not tc4 ihem very much about the.
public assistarice caseload- who was on urlfart.. wherc.
did they come frorrr. whj wf,rra they on it. what thr.1
rteeded in order t o get off *

'

Due t o t h r dichoton~) o f responsibility, leedback information is st,ldom
brought together for arlalysis. Without this analysis, prediction for futurc~
needs cannot bc made.
Matching Grants and Local Choice

Thc programmatic approach does 1101 require higher level governments
t o rnakr value judgments for lower Irvel governments. When a central
gcjvernrnent rcquircs a sub unit to pay a certain peicentage of a program,
it is making judgments about a satisfaction received by the sub unit, and
the decision is rnade without the participation of the sub. As stated above,
Break favors this, but his own work can be used as support for the idea
that matching grants should not be used. I-le says:
12~lizabethB. Drew, "HEW Grapples with PPBS," The Public Interest, No. 8
(Summer. 1967), p. 11.
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In principle, the grantor's share of program costs should
equal the ratio of' external benefits to total benefits, but
in practice problems of measurement compel the use of
only a rough approximation of the idea. Nevertheless,
some reasonable distinctions between programs, and between states under a given program s h o d d be possible.
The spillout of benefits from state and local educational
programs, for example, is presumably greater for lowincome than for high-income areas, since the former
typically have the higher rates of out-migation. Such a
situation calls for variable matching grants, the grantor
government paying a higher share of FogTam costs in
the lower-income states and localities.'
Thus Break indicates that the grantor will impose value judgments on
the granter in the case of education on the basis of presumptions about
the typical grantee. Not only are benefits difficult to measure, but Break
admits that they vary. To him such a situation calls for a variable matching
grant. This sounds like an administrative impossibility. Since benefits are
difficult to meaure and since they vary from local district to local
district, the more defensible policy is for each level of government to
provide its own expenditures without fiscal coercion by another level and
without making value judgments for another level. In this way the participants of all levels can express their demands in relation to their selfassessed benefits.
Additional support from Break which indicates that matching grants
should not be used is that matching grants do not guarantee that the function will be performed. IIe says:
Consider . . . a state spending program that generates
external benefits whose importance is indeterminate
within a wide rangy, say between 10 percent and 40 percent of total social and private benefits. . . . [Grants]
covering 10 percent of total cost, would expand that
program and move its operation to the levels justified by
its total benefit-cost ratio. To stop f'ederal aid a t the
point, however, would not guarantee optimal results.
Even if external benefits were only 10 percent of total
benefits, some states might be unable t o finance their
own 90 percent shares, and if external benefits were
more important than that even states with ample funds
would lack incentives to give the program as much support as it should have.14

1 3 ~ r e a kop.
, cit., p. 77. (Italics added.)
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prop:irlr \20111(1 1101 I)(. ~)rovitit.d.'I'lrc. ivitlttr i1rt.a r111i1 41011ltl
al)+cwc.c.01' ;I tr~atchii~g
(11-vic.csI'r~cbtratc.itr p ~ ~ r p o h ~ . .

I I O ~

l1.t

rr11rllit11~11~
o f tr~utc.Itit~gf)c~rc.r.r~iagt~,
I I ~c , o i t ~ c . i t l ~~. v i ~ I,c.r~c~l'it,.
lt
ant1 clc,c.t i c . t)rc,\itit.el.

awa! \\it11 thrs \)ossil)ilit! Illat 1111.soc.i;rl go1)c11%ill trot

,111ror1gp a r ~ tprograrils. thc3 I ~ ~ l e ~ r ~Iligh\va!
tatc~ S>~~I.III
i> ( ! i s t i ~ ~ g ~ l i sby
l ~ ~the\
d /rig11 f)roportiot~of ( ~ ~ slt' iht i a ~ ~ ( , ~ * ( i
1)). ~ I I ( . fc:dt:ral govc.rnn~t.nt (9O-05 ~)cxrc,c.t~t)
urltl I)! tilts
fact that thtbsct costs arc, 111ot l ' r o t ~cnrtl~arhctl
~
taxc.? O I I
motor fnc:ls. tir(:h a t ~ t ltul,r.>. anti ot1rc.r procluc.tr 1)trrc.hasc\d by highway uwrs. 'l'ht. lirogratn c ~ o ~ ~ s c ' c l r ~i~s ~ t ~ t l !
t'rt,c of t11c. usual appropriatior~ c o ~ ~ t r o l as . ~ hitrc~s
~ d it
c:lt.arly firlances a large share 01' i~~trastatc.
highwa) t)t*rrc,fits, it is lihc.ly to ciivc,rt stat(, funds from h~~periol.
LIS('S.~
1 5 ~ e l m ablushlun, .'Harriers to a Systrrn of Fcdrral Grauts-irl-Aid," ~Vationnl7;s
Journal Y1II (Sr~tember.1960), p. 21 1

'

~ r a z v r .op. cit.. p. 3 14.

7 ~ r e a ho.p . cil.. p. Oh.
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,I
similar criticism has Ibc:cn ~rladro f F'c.ilrral wvlfare grants. Stat~:shave
t a h t ~funds
~
frotn on(. wc:ll'arcl program ~h(:rtkt11c.y wrre ncc:ded and put
tht:ln irrto otlrc:r wclfarc, programs it1 orclcr to gcst thc: grt,att:r n~atching
fl~nds.:4lthougli thc rational action for t l ~ c1owc.r 1f:vel rnay be t o dt:votc
rc:sourcc:s where they will give* the geattbst benefits, no firiancially-prr:sscd
It~gislaturt; wants to be acc.usc*d of turning down thc large Frdt:ral bribe.
\lushkin notes this misallocatior~probleln and ofC~.r. a solutio~l:

. . . it' tlre national govt:rnmer~t offers more dollars per
statc. dollar for public assistance, itates may be te~nptetl
to divert their fur~dsfrorrl public. health to public assistance. Fir~ancially inducc:d tra~isfvrsol' this type can be
avoided in state budgetary dccisiol~sby offering the same
fcbderal share t o a slate for each of the aided progralns.18
Tlli? s o l u t ~ o nscbcms to l'lil 011 at I~aast tl~rc-ecounts. First, it does not
dtternpt to dccourlt lor thv b e r ~ c t ~rc.cc.~tcd
t
slncr this vdrics from & ~ a r i t ( ~
to pantcse. Svrond, rven though the dldcd share for each program ii the
~ a l n c .tire total amount golng t o thc p r o p a m i will diffvr and sub u n ~ t s
w h ~ c hhave. already indiedied thdt the! bptv~dthew lunds t o get t h ~largest
,
Ft~derdlg a n t will contlnur to tio so. Third, wch arta s t ~ l lleft w ~ t hthe
problcm ol conr~parir~g
the lucratlvc. Fvd~.ral grant to local progrdlrls for
wh~c-hthcre are n o g- a n t ? ?'he k~cttcrs o l ~ ~ t i would
o ~ l be to rt,plarcs thc
rnat~:hit~gapproacl~with a progran~maticonch.
Even if' a fu~lctional ~natchingp a n t
c.nc1t.d. Brrah di~grc.11.;.say ing that t l ~ e

IS

usvd ~t should not bc open-

. . . fourth and final distinguishill r characteristic of optimizing grants is tha~t they shorll be open- rather than
closed-end-that is, the grantor should agree to share
whatever program costs the grantee wishes t o incur and
not t o limit its support t o somc fixed amount each
!ear.19

a"

If the grantor drcides on a given level of expend~tureswhich match(,\
benefits with costs, thcre is no reason t o expcLctadditional extcrnal benefits
to be forthcoming from exp1:nditures beyond that point. With a closr.tl-end
grant, local govc,rnrnents will bc. more liliely to u s the grant effectively.
Stimulation and Dernonstmtion

A rcaaon often given for 'I rnatching grant is that it will stirnulate the
I O W ~ Tlevel t o take avtion I I I I a f u ~ ~ c t i o ar i~t.h stimulation, as discussed
aljove, the higher lev1.1 is rnaking value judgments about what the local

-

' 8 ~ ~ s h kop.~ n ,

at.,

19f3reak, op. at.,

p. 208.

11. 78.

1.37 ]
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level should IN: doing and what knowledge the local level should have.
Spills arc. not involvt:d tlxcc:pt insofar as d i s t r i b u t i o ~of
~ information and
tt:cIinicluch is thv c:etltral goverr~n~et~t'h
responsibility. Without spills thr:
htirnulatiotr rri~lst conlci through dc~rnonstratiorr.To dcrnonstrate t o the
local levt:! kucans that 111(,project is a local matter and thc: choicc. ot'adoption should bti lel't to thr. local unit. With thr) p r o g a m n ~ a t i capproach,
rc,jcction u l tht: demor~stratiot~
ih riot 1c:l.t to the volition 01' a local government by allowing the local to rt~fnsc:to ~riatchthe central matching grant.
Ll'ith the progammatic. approach thc dc.rr~onstratiorr is sure to br made,
and tht- local governtnent nlay accept or rt:jflct tht: idea.
Labovitz's evidence, as presented by Xlushkin, seems t o indicate that
the programmatic approach could be arl effeclivr stirnulant. She summarizt:~L,abovitz7swork or1 the effectivc~ncasof categorical aid as a stimulus
~
certain prohvams:
to state a c t i o ~under
State and local expenditurrs for vocational education
have increased over the period of operation of the vocational education program faster than federal aid. Sirnilarly, stat(, funds for vocational rehabilitation and for
public health have increased more than federal monies.
These relativc changes arc rrflectcd in reduced federal
sharc of cost . . . .
'Thus t o the extent that the grant mechanism is used
to pinpoint a national objective and to encourage state
and local action in a specific direction, block grants arcA
not a substitute for categorical aids.20
Alushkir~also supports specific grants for demoristratio~~
purposes. She
and Adanis say:

In recent years . . . we have had a multiplication of small
grant sums authorized as "seed monies" t o focus attcntion on a needed public service through a demonstration
of new techniques.
innovation and experiment as primary devices for irnproving t h e efficiency of public services are gaining increased attentiom2

'

To Mushkin the block grant proposal . . . is not consistent . . . with a
national objectivt: of directing public services into specific channels."22
"

20~hlushkin,op. cit., pp. 200, 202, 203.
21

Selma Mushkin and Robert R. Adams, "Emerging Patterns of Federalism,"
(September. 1966), p. 235.
Z z % f ~ s h kop.
i ~ ~cit.,
, p. 205

National Tax Journal X I X
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Compliance

Two misconceptions about intergoverritnental expenditure approaches
which support unconditional block grants are: (1) that the primary purpose of Federal aid is to provide states with financial support t o carry out
the states' objectives, and (2) that states provide a more efficient and effective use of public funds if they have a wider latitude in directing
expenditures. As discussed above, the purpose of central government expenditures is to provide neither of the two.
Is the national interest iriet simply by providing states
with funds for a broad program area? An affirmative
answer assurnes that the national governmerit has PO
interest in direction of program content and no more
interest in one part o l the broader program than in
another.
hlost Federal aid programs, however, originate in
rather specific public needs and . . . categorical aids have
become an important instrument by which national action ih identified with those interest^.?^

Thr. programmatic approach spells out how these public needs will be met.
has been explained, the central level should not dictate strictly state
and local programs, but neither should state or local administrative ineffictiveness and rioncompliance frustrate broad-based wants. Due to "homerule" for education funds, the national and state interest has long been
frustrated by dvnying minority groups access to education.
Formula Terms

In reviewing grant-in-aid formulas, expenditure determinants such as
fiscal capacity, population, effort, and regression coefficients are found.
These are of a rather dubious nature if the purpose is to provide a governmental function.
The fiscal capacity term is sometimes rationalized by a "fence post"
theory of fiscal federalism. Like its political counterpart which denies oneman-one-vote political representation, this theory of fiscal federalism
argues that the way to attack individual povcxty is through a spatial grant
baised on fiscal capacity. This rationalization is used even when the grant
to the spatial area is for some function's need that is unrelated to income,
whether individual or spatial. Income distribution, however, should be
pursued on an individual basis. The problem of fiscal federalism " . . .
springs from the technical nature of the services arid the federal system

23k~ushkin,op. cit., p. 199.
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itsc4l' rotlrc~r t l ~ i r t r t'rorir tlil'l't:rir~gr.c:orrolt~ic potrrrtials a ~ r dthe. c:hoic:c. ol'
rc~distril,utivt~
fisc:al systvrtrs l)! subordinat(* units."24
1Lt.ah apvt-s that ~.clualizatiorrtcLrrrrs shorllei rrot k)c\ itlcluded i r i flrrrctional p a n t s i l l o r d t ~t o clia~rgc~
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or govtbrrl~nc~lrl,~:
'I'hough tlit*! Iracc. 1)vt.tr i~lc.rcsasingl! t.uploitc.d i t r tlris
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24110ward G . Schallrr. "Federal Grants 111 Aid: \r fitvirw." Proceedings of
the I*'ifty-eighth ,tnnuul Cor~.ferrrrcf~
or1 Ilixotior~of the Vutiorlcll Tux ,Issociation
(Novcml)c.r. 1965). p. 106.
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Effort is included in some allocation formulas and is measured as the
ratio of expenditures t o fiscal capacity. \'hen rewarding cffort either o n
an individual program basis o r or1 t h e basis of all governmental functions,
the higher levd is interfering with local value judgments. The higher level
is bribing the lower to expend morc o n on(: program than on another; and
o n the basis of all governmental functions. the bribing is done to get t h e
arc:a to experid relatively more on social than on private goods. If c:ffort is
rt:warded, then a wealthy area, where tastes for social goods are stronger
than in poorer areas, will receive morcs than tht: poorer areas. This is an
unacceptable concept of equity.

As H i r s ~ hand
~ ~~ r e a khave
~ ~ explainc,d, the overlapping and multiplicity of goverrlnlental units is necessary to adjust adequately for spills.
'Var) ing service spills indicate that some serviccs, such as libraries, should
Ile handled by local urban -governments; othvr ser\ic%t.s,such as 5treet maintenance, by metropolitan areas; still others, such as planning, water, and
[)owr:r, by more arcawide governmental units. Since the areawidc governruerital units will overlap other units such as states, counties, and cities,
cooperation among t'hese units is necessary. An optimal solution is really
impossible unless the multitude of overlapping governmental units d o
work together. Without cooperation one unit will not know what t o expect in the way of spill-ins from the other units, and therefore cannot
riitionally adjust its own resources t o provide the desired level of services.

Intergovernmental cooperation will become even more important in the
fr~ture..As the population grows and mobility arid the demand for public
sc:rvices increase, the spillover problem will become rnore pronounced and
complex. In order to cooperate effectively, the respective units must be
al~lt:t o communicate well-defined programs with estimates about costs and
ahout the direction and extent of benefits. The Advisory Commission o n
Iritergovernmental lielations has expressed the samc idea in t h e following
manner:
Cost-benefit analysis designed to provide a basis for cooperative negotiation+ among jrrrisdictioris has come into
rather extensive use recently in conjunction with many
Federal programs, especially in regard t o watcr resources,
recreation, and highways. This technique may offer helpful guidelines for use by separate jurisdictions in metropolitan areas.
2 7 ~ i r s ~op.
h , cit., p. 338.
2 8 ~ r e a kop.
, cit., p. 69.
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For rnany metropolitan areas. a sirlgle art:awitit. govt:rrlrnent whosc boundaries are c*oterminous with tl~c.
scope of a particular servic:e is ~lritherlikely nor nt3cessarily appropriate. Irr many situatiol~sit appear* rnorch
likely that ad hoc o r functiorl-by-functiorl arrangenlelits
among existing local units will assure that thest, furrctior~s
will be performed more r:fficirntly or1 an art:awidc basis.
Such arrangements will requirt. allocating t h e costs 01'
st:rvicc:s among the i r ~ d e ~ e n d e runits
lt
on a fair a r ~ dvcluitablr basis.*'

J u s t as thc tcchr~icalknowledge. c.ontaitred in the prograrnrnatic plan
nlakes ir~tergovernrnentalc:ooperatior~ t.asic.r. it also tr~akt>sir~terproganr
coordinatior~t:asier. Program coordir~atior~
is necessary if various prograrlw
art: not t o frustrate the objcctives o f on(. anotht:r. 111 additiorl? rnuch adrninistrativc. cost can bt: saved by progarn coordination. The progralnrnatic approach increases the possibility of coordinatiorr because each governrnt:rltal unit knows precisely how rnuch of what specific progarrl is to
Ircl accomplished. With matching funds the local I t . \ t ~ l rnrlst dtscide to
match thr. f'unds before coordination can hcgirl, and tsach sLa11. may rnatc11
a diffcrt:nt set o t programs. With uricoriditional parlts, thchrr, is rlo prior
knowledge of rithcr which f'unds will bt: usctd or how they will bt. utilized.
After corlsiclerirlg theses specific issues i l l corijur~ctiot~
with thr:or) ? it
g equalappears that a programmatic approach which excludes ~ n a t c h i r ~arlcl
ization grants posszssc:~thc greatest promist, for el'i'icierlcy in ilrtergovcrtrr ~ ~ e n texperltliture
al
policy.

2 9 ~ . Advisory
~ .
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, ,Wetropolitan Social
and Economic Disparities: Implications for Intergovernmental Relations in Central
Cities and Suburbs, A25 (Washington, D.C.: I1.S. Government Printing Office, 1965),
p. 57.

